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The Broadcasting Activities of the

European Community and Their
Implications for National Broadcasting
Systems in Europe
By WOLFGANG HOFFMAN-RIEM*

I. GENERAL CONTEXT
A. Political and Social Significance of Broadcasting
Broadcasting is an economic phenomenon. For some time now,
broadcasters have had substantial economic relevance as clients for
other media industry businesses, as employers for a large number of
people, and, above all, as advertising media. Economic relevance
should not, however, disguise the fact that broadcasting also fulfills an
important cultural function. Broadcasting is both an economic and a
cultural phenomenon.
In a historical perspective, this is by no means new. The press, for
example, has always been both an economic and a cultural phenomenon - something which could be particularly observed in the nineteenth century. Yet wherever political struggles sought to protect the
freedom of communication, the more political aspect of journalism
has come to the fore. The development of freedom of the press in
Europe was decisively influenced by the understanding of freedom of
the press found in the United States, as embodied in the First Amendment. In turn, the American idea of freedom of the press was inspired
by developments in Europe, especially by the French Revolution.
Consequently, freedom of communication and of the media is
anchored today in a basic constitutional norm in most European coun* Professor of Law, University of Hamburg, Germany. The author would like to
acknowledge the assistance of his student, Andreas Fmckh, in writing this article. This
article was presented in March 1993 at the Hastings International and Comparative Law
Review's Eleventh Annual Symposium on International Legal Practice, "The European
Community in Evolution: Toward a Closer Political & Economic Union."
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tries or is otherwise protected by ordinary law or through the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
The ideas of civil rights and civil liberties are rooted in the liberal
understanding of basic rights. One important aim is the free development of individuals. Communication also renders a service to society.
It is hoped that the exchange of information and views will create the
opportunities and abilities to form opinions and to realize what is
"ight." Communication is a means of filtering out a "true" factual
basis and, thus, reaching a decision acknowledged as meaningful
(right). According to traditional free speech theory, there are at least
four reasons for a special protection of free speech. They are related
to:
(1) individual self-fulfillment;
(2) advancing knowledge and discovering truth;
(3) promoting democracy through a process of self-governing society and by checking abuses of power by public officials; and
(4) the functioning of society, especially assuming a proper balance between conflict and consensus, allowing social change, and
fostering social integration.
Most European societies value freedom of speech not as an end
to itself, but rather as a means to reach these normative objectives,
especially the promotion of democracy. Therefore, mass communication is deemed to have an important socio-cultural dimension. Mass
media renders a service to society. The government, especially the
legislature, is assigned the responsibility of ensuring that the process
of informing the public, of exchanging ideas, and thus of influencing
the shaping of values by mass media functions in real freedom, not
prejudiced by either the state or by private power holders.
Communicative development, therefore, is vitally important to
social and political development. Especially in the nineteenth century, the conviction prevailed in Europe that freedom had to be primarily defended against the state, since it was the state which
jeopardized it most. The fact that basic rights had been historically
directed against the feudal order, that is, against the dominant agencies of state and societal power in this order, had been by and large
forgotten. However, there also was an awareness of the threat posed
by non-state agencies of power. In particular, the Church could jeopardize freedom of communication. This awareness, however, did not
have a formative influence on the legal concretization of freedom.
Basic rights were solely concretized as defensive rights, protecting individuals from interference by the state.
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The situation changed somewhat during the twentieth century.
The crisis of state regulation, the emergence of new "private" power
holders, especially large, multinationally operating, multimedia enterprises, and the interdependence of numerous sectors of the economy
have increased the awareness that there are new risks for the freedom
of communication. These risks may require basic rights to do more
than defend freedom against interference by the state. There has
been a particularly intense discussion on this question in Germany.
The German Constitutional Court in particular, which has exerted a decisive influence on the political development of postwar
Germany, developed a concept of basic rights from the start. This
concept recognizes that basic rights are anchored in a host of different
constitutional objectives, the primary one being the goal of democracy.' In the field of mass communications, the state is assigned the
responsibility of ensuring that the process of informing the public and
of forming opinions functions freely2 While there are almost no special regulations in the area of the press, Europe has a long tradition in
broadcasting regulation. The justification is not limited to spectrum
scarcity. Other justifications refer to prohibitive costs, to the threat of
a high concentration of ownership, and to broadcasting's unique persuasiveness and influence on society. Government's affirmative role
in guaranteeing the functioning of broadcasting order and in protecting the public interest, including the democratic quality of public discourse, has been recognized until now-even in a time of new
electronic media, expanding distribution facilities, the advent of a
merger of transmission technologies, and a convergence of broadcast
and press law.
Appreciation of the various cultural dimensions of mass communications applies particularly to broadcasting. Broadcasting provides
information as well as entertainment for the individual citizen. Its
services are geared to the communicative orientation and development of citizens. Broadcasting is determinant of the development of
informed political opinion and of social integration. It provides information - its primary function - about socially relevant events, articu1. Cf. Donald C. Kommers, The Jurisprudenceof Free Speech in the UnitedStates and
the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL L REv. 657, 673 (1980).
2. The main judgments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional
Court) are: Judgment of Feb. 22, 1961, 12 BVerfGE 205 (1962); Judgment of July 27, 1971,
31 BVerfGE 314 (1972); Judgment of Jun. 16, 1981, 57 BVerfGE 295 (1982); Judgment of
Nov. 24,1986,73 BVerfGE 118 (1987); Judgment of Mar. 24,1987,74 BVerfGE 297 (1987);
and Judgment of Feb. 5, 1991, 83 BVerfGE 238 (1991).
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lates views held by the population, and helps to control the agencies of
state and social power. In this manner, broadcasting fulfills a public
task. How successfully it does so can become a question of survival
for democracy.
B. The Public Task of Broadcasting as a Subject-Matter of
Specific Communications Constitutions
The acknowledgement of the vital importance of the mass media
in the development of informed political opinion is nothing new. It is
at least as common in the United States as it is in Europe. The situation in Europe, however, reveals how broadcasting has always been
regarded as a power factor. This explains why, in almost all European
countries, governments have turned their attention to broadcasting
and subjected it to strict supervision or even government control. This
applies to Nazi Germany and the previous East Bloc states as well as
to countries such as France or Spain, which until recently, had broadcasting systems which were relatively dependent on the government.
In most countries, broadcasting has only gradually, albeit successfully,
been able to free itself from the clutches of government. Ensuring
independence from the government, however, need not necessitate reducing the state's regulatory responsibility for the structures of a free
broadcasting order. Accordingly, all European states have extensive
broadcasting laws that contain more trenchant regulations than those
found in the U.S.
In Europe, confidence that the democratic function of broadcasting is best protected by market forces is not as widespread as in the
United States. The prevalent European philosophy contends that the
public interest can only be protected through special structures of the
broadcasting system.3 There are calls for safeguards to ensure programming quality,4 diversity and impartiality of reporting, and broadcaster independence from agencies of state and social power. A
further demand is that risks -for example, for minors -- be minimized.5
3. For an analysis of the German model prior to the extensive introduction of private
broadcasting, with a comparative look to the United States, see Christopher Wittemann,
Note, West German Television Law: An Argument for Media as an Instrument of Self-Government, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & Comn'. L. Rnv. 147 (1983).
4. On the concept of programming quality, see K.E. Rosengren, Quality in Programming: Views from the North, 27 STUD. OF BROADCASTING 21 (1991).
5. For more information on the philosophy and individual organizational structures
of European broadcasting, see Vulnerable Values in West European Broadcasting,in TvLE,
VISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

(J.G. Blumler ed., 1992).
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Of course, the belief that free competition in opinions is the best
path to a diverse broadcasting system, and that deregulation is thus
appropriate, is also supported in Europe. Under this view, the crucial
question is whether regulation or deregulation is thus appropriate.
The proponents of deregulation contend that the market model of
broadcasting naturally leads to broadcasting diversity. At most, only
minimal governmental regulation is justified to counter undesired developments. However, this view, which has become increasingly popular in Europe, is not held by the majority. The majority believes that
empirical evidence validates doubts as to the suitability of reliance on
market forces alone.
Consideration of different recipient interests in programming illustrates this problem. A glance at the programming strategies of
most broadcasters shows that they are interested in monied, particularly younger viewers, whose consumption behavior can still be influenced, since the advertising industry mainly gears its messages to
these target groups. Older and poorer viewers are less of a target for
advertising. Thus, their communicative interests tend to be neglected.
This neglect is politically unacceptable if the goal of equal communicative opportunities is desired. Protecting this goal is regarded as a
basic requirement for the development of informed democratic opinion. A highly one-sided gratification of recipient interests, such as
that set forth above, is viewed as market failure and a justification for
legal safeguards or other measures, such as the support of public
broadcasting, to offset the shortcomings of private broadcasting.
Accordingly, European broadcasting systems still emphasize the
public task of the mass media and have, thus, not opted for a pure
market model. The broadcasting order is anchored by law. At least
programmatically and rhetorically, priority is given to the social and
cultural orientation of broadcasting and not to its economic aspect.
The organization of broadcasting in European states has been primarily influenced by its significance for the communicative development
of the individual and the political-cultural process. This concept was
originally realized through public monopolies, but European nations
have since developed, to differing degrees, dual systems of private and
public broadcasters. Even after opening up broadcasting to private
broadcasters, it is still subject to regulations. The "public-service
model," which subjects broadcasting to certain obligations as a public
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trustee, is still the prevalent model.6 These obligations may demand,
for example, truthful and impartial information. Structural safeguards
are also often elaborated to ensure diversity. In Germany, for example, a pluralistic composition of those bodies that have a decisive influence on programming in public broadcasting is thought to ensure
such diversity.' Finally, regulations designed to prevent state or onesided social influence are also important. The structures vary substantially from one country to another depending upon the means governments have at their disposal. In all European 'Community (EC)
member states, however, broadcasting regulations constitute a separate communications constitution which relates to the individual political and social system.'
C.

No Express EC Competences

The broadcasting orders in European countries are traditionally
anchored in their respective political constitutions.' A Europe-wide
regulation of broadcasting which takes up these traditions presupposes political union in Europe. Despite the 1986 Single European
Act and the Maastricht Treaty, however, such a political union has not
materialized. 10 During the past decades, the EC has been transformed from a system of basic international treaties into an organization with supranational character. The legal stipulations of the
European Communities are indirectly and directly applicable in member states, with a fundamental precedence of European law. The
Community, however, has neither comprehensive jurisdiction nor the
power to determine the range of its regulatory competence. Rather,
the EC's regulatory powers are limited to those enumerated in the
6. For an overview of the "public-service model," see, e.g., EUROPE: EUROMEDIA
RESEARCH GROUP HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND POLI-

IN WESTERN EUROPE (H. J. Kleinsteuber et al. eds., 1986); Broadcastingand Politics
in Western Europe, 8 W. EUR. Pot. (Special Issue) (R. Kuhn ed., 1935); INTERNATIONALES
HANDBUCH FOR HORFUNK uND FERNSEHEN 1992/93 § D (Hans-Bredow-Institut ed., 199293).
7. Wittemann, supra note 3.
8. Compare also, on this aspect, the articles in Media and the Law- The Changing
Landscape of Western Europe, 7 EUR. J: COMM. (Special Issue) (Wolfgang HoffmannRiem ed., 1992).
9. On the freedom of communication in the context of basic rights and on its implications for the media order in Germany, see W. Hoffmann-Riem, Freedom of Information
and New Technological Developments in the Federal Republic of Germany - A Case Law
Analysis, in TRANSFRONTIER TELEVISION IN EUROPE: THE HUMAN RIOHrrS DIMENSION 49
(A. Cassese & A. Clapham eds., 1990).
10. BEUTLER ET AL., DIE EUROPAisCHE GEMEINSCHAFr 43-44 (3d ed. 1987).
TICS
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treaty: The EC can only issue regulations in areas in which it is empowered to do so by the Treaties of Rome.
The EC is still, first and foremost, an economic community.
However, it is not restricted in its activities to the economy in the
narrower sense, since economic integration is impossible without consideration of the economic aspects of social fields, including culture."
The main functions for the structuring of the political order, especially
the establishment and sustainment of social integration and political
unity, continue to rest with member states.' 2
Broadcasting, a field of activity which is only partly determined
by economics, is therefore a borderline area of EC jurisdiction.
Therefore, no provision in the Treaties of Rome expressly empowers
the EC to become active in the field of broadcasting. Thus, the EC
lacks competence to design an extensive broadcasting constitution.' 3
Even an adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht would not initially alter
this situation, despite the fact that this treaty partly deals with the
"flowering of the cultures of the Member States." For example, the
EC cannot issue regulations primarily aimed at developing informed
democratic opinion and social integration. Furthermore, the EC cannot require broadcasters to be public trustees, demand broadcasters'
independence from the state, or insist on programming commitments
which guarantee diversity. It appears no one gave consideration to
the idea of setting up a market for broadcasters when setting up the
European Economic Community.
H. SPECIFIC BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Harmonization Tendencies and the EC's Economic Point of
Reference
As previously mentioned, the Treaties of Rome do not provide
for regulation of mass communications. It may seem surprising, therefore, that the EC adopted an extremely detailed regulation of television broadcasting activities in the Television Directive of October 3,
11. W.H. Roth, GrenzabersdireitenderRundfimk und Dienstleistungsfreiheit, 149
HANDELs - uND WiRTSCHAFTSRECHT (ZHR) 679, 684
(1985); LE. Schwartz, Rundfunk und EWG-Vertrag, in FERNsEH.N OHNF GP.NMza (J.
Schwarze ed., 1985).
12. H.P. IPsEN, RuNDFUrN IM EUROPAiscHEN GEMEINSCHAsREcHr 40 (1983).
13. See Seidel, in FERNSEHEN oHN GRENZEN, supra note 11; G. Herrmann, Europa
7ErITScHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMT

und die Medien, 29 ZErrSCHRIFTFOR UmEBER - UND VERLAGSRECHT (ZUM) 175 (1985).
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1989.14 This directive was coordinated with the European Convention
on Transfrontier Television adopted by the Council of Europe on May
5, 1989. This convention applies to more countries than the EC Television Directive, but has a weaker legal priority. Furthermore, the
Television Directive is only part of a more comprehensive EC audiovisual policy. For example, the EC audiovisual policy contains an action
plan to promote the audiovisual industry and the process of harmonizing national copyright law via the Copyright Directive."5 The EC
leaders are also considering special merger control measures in the
audiovisual sector. The following considerations, however, are limited
to the television sector and thus above all to the Television Directive.
The motivation for legal harmonization in the EC is relatively
easy to understand.' 6 The traditional structures of the European markets in the audiovisual sector are still quite heterogeneous. The international ramifications of technology and industry, however, make it
possible to think in terms of large regions and markets in telecommunications. In addition, European cooperation in broadcasting has a
long tradition. A Europe-wide market for the production and use of
broadcast programs has existed for some time, and there is multinational cooperation in their distribution. The privatization and development of satellite technology has also provided numerous
commercial stimuli for harmonization. Broadcasting is also important
to Europe's political integration. Industrial policy also requires a unified media market to ensure that European companies remain competitive.' 7 Finally, there is concern that "Americanization"
jeopardizes European traditions and cultural identity.' 8 Therefore,
since the beginning of the 1980s, the institutions of the EC have tried
to create a "television without frontiers."'19
Due to the lack of specific broadcasting competences, the EC's
point of reference has been an economic norm: the free movement of
services specified in article 59, paragraph 1 of the EEC Treaty. This
14. Council Directive 89/552 On the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of
Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Television Directive],
15. See Jerome Huet & Jane C. Ginsberg, Computer ProgramsinEurope: A Comparative Analysis of the 1991 EC Software Directive,30 CoLuM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 327 (1992).
16. On the goals of the EC in the audiovisual sector, see also B. HOLZNAGEL, MEDIA
LAW AND REGULATION OF THE EEC (unpublished).
17. See Television Directive, supra note 14, pmbl.
18. On the situation of the European media market, see G.M. Luyken, Europa 1992:
Auch ein BinnenmarktfAr Medien? 2-3 RUNDFUNK UND FERNSEH.N (RuF) 167 (1989).
19. For further details, see D. KUGELMANN, DER RUNDFUNK UND DIE DENSTLIS.
TUNGSFREIHErr DES EWG-VERTRAGES 26 et seq. (Duncker & Humblot 1991).
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provision applies directly to all EC states and prohibits regulations
that impede the transfrontier exchange of remunerated services.20
The free movement of services is*a basic economic freedom of the EC,
as is the free movement of goods, persons and capital. The EC's
Court of Justice in Luxembourg has confirmed in several decisions
that broadcasting is a "service" in this sense. 21 Unlike activities in
member states, the EC takes economics as its point of reference.2 In
particular, the Commission of the European Communities has regarded its broadcasting activities as part of the effort to create a single
market for services by 1993. This presumes a harmonization of laws.
The Television Directive was issued with this presupposition in mind.
B. The Television Directive
The Directive has become the most important instrument of legal
character in broadcasting. 3 In accordance with article 185 of the
EEC Treaty, the Directive binds all members. However, it initially
only requires members to issue corresponding national laws. If this
obligation is neglected, a directive can take direct effect as long as its
content is sufficiently concrete. While the EC Television Directive
was to be implemented by October 3, 1991, some member states have
yet to comply.
The Directive's application is limited to television; radio remains
unregulated. The Directive requires all EC member states to supervise the compliance of broadcasters in their jurisdiction.24 However,
member states do not control broadcasters transmitting into their
country from other countries. This "sender state principle" makes it
much easier for broadcasters to broadcast in several EC countries.
The Directive has substantive regulations in only a few fields.
Advertising and sponsoring are extensively regulated. The separation
of advertising and editorial programming,' the limited admissibility
20. On the direct significance of the free movement of services for broadcasting with
examples of court rulings, see HOLZNAGEL, supra note 16.
21. See Case 155173, The State v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R_ 409, 428; Case 52/79, Procureur
du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R1 833; Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteeders et a]. v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.1R 2085, 2125.
22. On the various services provided in connection with the organization of broadcasting, see D. Kugelmann, Die Grenzen des Anwendungsbereides der EG-Femsdzridttlinie,
25 Din VERWALruNG 515, 519 et seq. (1992).
23. For a more detailed look at the legal nature of the directive, see D. LAsoK & J.W.
BRMDGE, LAW & NsTrrrONS oF THE EutoPEN CommuNtmEs 137 el seq. (5th ed. 1991).
24. Television Directive, supra note 14, art. 3(2).
25. Id. art. 10(1).
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of isolated advertising spots,2 6 and certain quantitative and contentrelated commitments are examples of such regulation. Furthermore,
there is a complete ban on subliminal advertising techniques, surreptitious advertising, and advertising for cigarettes and other tobacco
goods. 27
Additional regulated fields are the protection of minors28 and the
right of reply.29 Finally, the mildly worded quota regulation in favor
of "European works" should be mentioned." This protectionist provision, which is not merely culturally motivated, 3 1 urges member
states "where practicable and by appropriate means" to ensure that
broadcasters reserve a majority of transmission time for European
works. This provision is disputed due to its dubious objective and
doubts about its binding effects and ability to be implemented. The
details of this dispute will not be dealt with here.
26. Id. art. 11.
27. Id. arts. 10(3)-(4), 13.
28. Id. art. 22. Article 22 reads: "Member States shall take appropriate measures to
ensure that television broadcasts by broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not include
programmes which might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of
minors, in particular those that involve pornography or gratuitous violence. This provision
shall extend to other programs which are likely to impair the physical, mental or moral
development of minors, except where it is ensured, by selecting the time of the broadcast
or by any technical measure, that minors in the area of transmission will not normally hear
or see such broadcasts. Member States shall also ensure that broadcasts do not contain any
incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality."
29. Id. art. 23.
30. Id. arts. 4-6. Article 4(1) reads as follows:
Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means that
broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to
news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This proportion,
having regard to the broadcaster's informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.
Article 5 reads:

Member States shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that
broadcasters reserve at least 10% of their transmission time, excluding the time
appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services, or alternately, at the discretion of the Member State, at least 10% of their programming budget, for European works created by producers who are independent of
broadcasters. This proportion, having regards to broadcasters' informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public, should
be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria; it must be achieved by
earmarking an adequate proportion for recent works, that is to say works transmitted within five years of their production.
31. See Television Directive, supra note 14, pmbl. ("whereas coordination is nevertheless needed to make it easier for persons and industries producing programmes having a
cultural objective to take up and pursue their activities").
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These regulations are the sum total of the commitments for
broadcasters imposed by the EC Television Directive. Individual
states, however, can tighten the Directive's requirements for their
32 and for advertising intended solely for their national
broadcasters
33
territory.
C. Significance of the Television Directive
In comparison with the broadcasting constitutions of the member
states, these regulations are rudimentary indeed. There is no sign of
the provisions which traditionally form the content of broadcasting
norms in Europe. There are no stipulations safeguarding diversity
and impartiality, no commitments to objective and extensive information, and no safeguards against an undesired concentration of economic and editorial power in broadcasting. Due to its limited
competences, the EC does not even have the power to make most of
these regulations. The EC thus limits its activities to a small section of
those regulations which are a-part of all European broadcasting
constitutions.
The decisive question is whether the Television Directive is a definitive regulation of broadcasting in Europe. If it is, large portions of
the broadcasting constitutions of member states are incompatible with
European law, and the Television Directive is, thus, an extensive deregulation measure. In an order solely orientated towards economic
freedoms, however, deregulation means implementation of the market principle. In this respect, therefore, non-regulation means supporting a certain broadcasting model, the almost pure market model.
Such support would be associated with a renunciation of differentiated broadcasting models such as those which currently exist in the
dual systems of European countries. Treating the Television Directive
as a definitive regulation of broadcasting in the EC is thus tantamount
to shifting paradigms.3 4 Instead of culture, economics would be the
focus of broadcasting regulations. However, whether or not the Television Directive can be viewed this way is a moot point.
The EC Commission, the initiator of the harmonization of broadcasting laws, originally adopted such a radically market-oriented
stance. It presented this position in 1984 in its so-called "Green Pa32. Id. art. 3.
33. Id. art. 20.
34. See W. Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunkredht und Wirtsdhaftsredt - ein Paradigmawechsel in der Rundfunkverfassung?, in RUNrFUNK IM WEBFENEIBSVECHT 13 et seq. (Wolf-

gang Hoffmann-Riem ed., 1988).
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per" entitled "Television Without Frontiers. '35 'The argument set
forth by the Commission was a narrow interpretation of the reasons
that could justify restrictions of the free movement of services provided for in article 59 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission also referred to the ECHR.3 6 The initiator of this Convention was the

Council of Europe, not the EC. Nonetheless, member states and the
EC recognize the ECHR as binding. Together with the constitutional
traditions of member states, the Convention strongly influences basic
rights in the EC. It thus compensates for the absence of basic rights
norms in EC treaties. Article 10 of the ECHR provides for freedom
of expression, including broadcasting freedom. 37 Article 10 stipulates
that individual states may subject broadcasters to licensing procedures. Through this provision the ECHR recognized traditional state
competence for the regulations of broadcasting orders. Licensing also
helped justify the public-interest commitments of broadcasting. 38 In
its Green Paper, on the other hand, the EC Commission views licensing as merely a formal act which does not allow reference to criteria
other than article 10, paragraph 2. Values such as national security,
public safety and order, were thus viewed as entitled to protection.
The legitimacy of objectives relating to a specific broadcasting consti35. Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common
Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM(84)300 final of June 14,
1984.
36. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
37. Article 10 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure or information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
38. For more details on the interpretation of ECHR art. 10, s-e WOLFOANO HOFFMANN-RIEM, RUNDFUNKRECHT NEBEN WIRTCH-IAFrSRECHT 186 et seq. (1991); N. Petersen, Der Gestaltungsspielraum des mitgliedstaatlichen Rundfunkgesetzgebers im Bereich
der Dienstleistungsfreiheit (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hamburg,
(Germany)). See also C. Engel, Privater Rundfunk vor der Europiischen Menschenrechtskonvention (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hamburg, (Germany)).
39. For more on this, mainly in support, see Engel, supra note 38.
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tution, therefore, was disputed. The Commission ignored the fact that
no doubts had been expressed f6r decades about the compatibility of
national broadcasting constitutions and article 10 of the ECHR. It
also neglected the second cornerstone of the EC's protection of basic
rights, the common constitutional principles of member states.40 Furthermore, in light of such a narrow interpretation of the exemptions
from the free movement of services, the inclusion of detailed regulations for advertising placement cannot be justified.4 1
Regardless of the view taken on a market model of broadcasting,
a political argument against EC deregulation is that such developments in a democratic system must be based on a corresponding development of informed opinion in parliamentary institutions.
Although the European Parliament was involved in the process of issuing the Television Directive, the Directive was not a legal instrument of Parliament, whose competences are still weak.
The EC Commission's argument in the Green Paper has been
criticized in relevant literature and in political circles.42 The European Court of Human Rights, which is responsible for the interpretation of the ECHR, has not definitively stated its position, but has
assumed a mediatory role in various decisions.4 3 Due to such criticism, the EC Commission has softened its position. Although the Directive's preamble still relates to the free movement of services and
ECHR article 10, there is no longer mention of the illegitimacy of
specific broadcasting regulations. The Commission has now emphasized that the Directive regulates "the minimum required to ensure
free broadcasting" and does not affect the competence of member
states for the organization, financing, and content of broadcasting.
The Commission has stressed the importance of cultural independence and diversity. At least verbally, therefore, there is a declaration
of support for broadcasting's socio-cultural function. However, this
40. See Case 4479, Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3750. On the constitutional traditions in the field of broadcasting, see Petersen, supra note 38.
41. For a detailed look at the criticism of the line of argument taken in the Green
Paper, see Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Europtiisierungdes Rundfimks - aber ohne Kommunkationsverfassung?,in RunDFuNK IMWE-rvENnmsRcEr, supra note 34, at 201,205.
42. In Germany, see, eg., Stellungnahme von ARD und ZDF zum Vorschlag eineir
Rundfunk-Richtlinie, Media Perspektiven Dokumentation 19186, 121 et seq.; BeschluB des
Bundesrates zum Vorschlag einer EG-Rundfunk-Richtlinie, Bundesratdrucks. 259186 of
Sept. 20. 1986, Media Perspektiven Dokumentation 11187, 143-44.
43. See Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. LR. (ser. A) (1990); Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
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concern does not find expression in individual regulations and may be
mainly lip service.
As pointed out, member states still retained the power to make
legal commitments for national broadcasters after the Directive was
issued. In the fields of advertising and protection of minors, which
have been harmonized by the Directive, member states are still allowed to subject their broadcasters to stricter norms. In fact, however, there is considerable pressure to reduce previous commitments.
Strict commitments are handicaps for national broadcasters competing with foreign firms because states must allow almost unlimited
journalistic and economic competition by foreign broadcasters, even if
the latter are subjected to less strict commitments. This principle does
not only apply to foreign broadcasters that are mainly oriented to
their own audiences. Broadcasters that specifically transmit programs
for the audience of recipient states should also be allowed to do so
unimpaired.
In the age of transfrontier technology and growing international
links, the number of internationally broadcast programs can be expected to increase. Some already exist today. They can indeed represent functional equivalents of national programs. If some
broadcasters are exempted from programming commitments and diversity safeguards in a member state of the EC, they can gain a considerable competitive edge over broadcasters subjected to stricter
commitments in other countries. This exemption would put an end to
equal competitive opportunities. Furthermore, foreign broadcasters
could use their journalistic power to one-sidedly influence the development of public opinion in other states. According to the EC Directive, the recipient state is powerless in the face of such activities. It
can only respond to competitive imbalance by exempting its national
broadcasters from impedimentary restrictions. Individual states,
therefore, must deregulate to avoid discrimination against their national broadcasters. Member states are thus forced to liberalize in
fields not definitively regulated by the Directive. In other words:
Even though the regulatory power of the national broadcasting legislator is not directly affected, its de facto room for maneuver is restricted. If national legislators intend to maintain competitive
opportunities for their broadcasters vis-i-vis foreign firms, they may
be forced to refrain from using their regulatory power.
The Television Directive does not prohibit retention of a dual system comprising private (commercial) and public (fee-based) broadcasters. The pressure for liberalization, however, indirectly affects the
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public service pillar of the dual broadcasting system. Due to the competitive situation, public broadcasting finds itself under tremendous
pressure to adapt in order to maintain its previous position and to
avoid becoming a broadcasting niche for an intellectual minority. 4
Such a process of adaptation to the behavior of commercial broadcasters can already be observed at a national level. Furthermore, political
willingness to support public broadcasting is likely to decline if it cannot record sufficient ratings. This probability means that public
broadcasters will try to obtain as large a slice of the mass audience
"pie" as possible by sacrificing their programming philosophy-a phenomenon which can be observed everywhere.4 5
Irrespective of the regulatory jurisdiction of member states over
their broadcasters, the Television Directive exerts substantial pressure
to liberalize. It creates a pronounced tendency towards the deregulation, albeit legal deregulation, of broadcasting in Europe.
LI1.

EFFECTS OF ANTITRUST LAW
ON BROADCASTING

If the economics of broadcasting become increasingly important
as a result of the Television Diiective, interest must concentrate on
legal instruments designed to support the efficiency of the economic
market. The most important of these instruments are the antitrust
regulations in the EEC Treaty' and the Merger Control Regulation
of December 21, 1989.17 Apart from their regulatory efficiency, a
highly significant aspect is the extent to which they are able to take
into account specific broadcasting interests.
A. Instruments of EC Antitrust Law
The main antitrust provisions in the EEC Treaty are contained in
article 85. Article 85, paragraph 1 contains a ban on agreements or
decisions which restrain competition. Under certain conditions, the
44. The Future of the BBC, DEP'T NAT'L HERrTAGE (London, November 1992).
45. The pressure to adapt has had varying consequences in the different European
countries. Regarding the German situation, a comparative programming assessment show
that public broadcasting still has an independent programming profile. See U.M. KROGEt,
PROGRAMMPROFILE IM DuALEN FERNSEHSYSTEM 1985-1990 (1992). For information on
the situation in Britain, see BBC PUBICAnrONS, ExT'rMMo CHOICE: THm BBC's RoLE I
=HNEw BROADCASTING AGE (1992).
46. On the application of these norms in the field of broadcasting, see HoLmZAGEL,
supra note 16.
47. 1989 OJ. (L 257) 14.
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Commission can, in accordance with article 85, paragraph 3, exempt
agreements normally covered by the ban.
Article 90, paragraph 2 declares the rules of competition inapplicable to undertakings in the general economic interest insofar as application of such antitrust rules would obstruct the performance of
tasks assigned to such undertakings.
Finally, the EC's Merger Control Regulation, which became effective on September 21, 1990, should be mentioned. As opposed to
directives, such regulations do not have to be turned into national law.
In other words, they are directly applicable.48 The Merger Control
Regulation intervenes wherever mergers establish or strengthen a
market dominant position, but only insofar as they are of Communitywide importance. Community-wide importance is determined on the
basis of the turnover of the companies concerned. It is deemed to
exist if:
- the worldwide turnover of the companies concerned exceeds five
billion ecu;
- the Community-wide turnover of at least two of the companies
concerned exceeds 250 million ecu; and
- the companies concerned do not record more than two-thirds of
their Community-wide turnover in a single member state.
B.

Applicability of Antitrust Law to Broadcastcrs

The EC's antitrust laws do not contain express regulations on audio-visual media. It is not clear to what extent they are applicable to
broadcasting. Applicability of antitrust law to private broadcasters
presents no problems. Publications on commercial law, however,
have not hesitated to apply article 85ff of the EEC Treaty to public
broadcasting as well.4 9 Public corporations have taken the view that
they are not "companies" as specified in the EEC Treaty. However,
this view has not gained general acceptance.5" Nevertheless, the EC
Commission has not yet defined the programming activities of broad48. For more details on the legal nature of regulations, see LASOK & BRIDOE, supra
note 23, at 127 et seq.

49. E.J. MSTMACicR ET AL., DER EINFLUB DES EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHA-r.
SRECHTS AUF DIE DEUTscHE RUNDFUNKORDNUNG (1990); V. EMMERICH & U. STEINER,
MOGLICHKEITEN uND GRENZEN DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN BETATIOUNO DER OFFENTLICHRECHTLICHEN RUNDFUNKANSTALTEN (1986); N. Reich, Rundfunkrecht und Wettbewerbsrecht vor dem Forum des europdischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, in RUNDFUNK IM
WETrBENEIBSRECHT, supra note 34, at 224, 228-29, 235 et seq.
50. See, e.g., Commission Decision 284/36, Filmeinkauf deuts-her Fernsehanstalten,

1989 OJ. (L 2) [hereinafter FilmeinkauA.
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casting as "market behavior." The activities of the EC, therefore, concentrate on preceding or successive stages of activity, such as program
procurement and advertising. 51 In these areas, the applicability of European antitrust regulations is also recognized for public broadcasting. 52 The Commission has also made several decisions in these
fields. 53 It has clearly indicated its intention to apply antitrust law in
other cultural fields as well. 4
The Merger Control Regulation is practically relevant only to privately operated broadcasting. In view of the dimensions involved and
the high threshold requirements for Community-wide significance,
however, it is highly improbable that this regulation will become important to broadcasting. Furthermore, no decision has yet been made
as to the media. Due to the lack of regulations relating specifically to
broadcasting, the Merger Control Directive is unable to relate to multimedia links. The print and audiovisual media in particular form separate markets. This leaves merger control ineffective in the absence
of special regulation.'5
C. Possibilities of Considering National Broadcasting Constitution
Laws
As pointed out, national laws can, in consideration of their cultural task, grant broadcasters a special status which would otherwise
be regarded as a restraint or abuse of competitive relations. An undifferentiated application of the antitrust regulations of the EEC Treaty,
therefore, would have implications for the national broadcasting constitutions. The special characteristics allowed under broadcasting law,
often applied in particular to public broadcasting, would be undermined by antitrust law. The regulatory jurisdiction of member states
in the cultural sector would thus be reduced even further.
The question is, therefore, whether EC competition law is a point
of reference for specifically considering communication matters. This
is particularly doubtful with regard to article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
The interpretation of vaguely defined legal terms, exemption deci51. On individual activities, see M. FROHUNGER, EG-WnrrEwEsRcmRr un
(1992).
52. See Reich, supra note 49, at 231.
53. Filneinkauf,supra note 50; Commission Decision interpreting article 26 of the
EEC Treaty, Magill TV Guide V. ITP, BBC, RTE, 1988 OJ. (L 78) 43.
54. Commission Decision interpreting Article 85 of the EEC Teaty, UIP, 1989 OJ. (L
226) 25; Commission Decision, "Netto-Btlcher"-Vereinbarungen (Publishers Assoc.-Net
Book Agreement), 1988 OJ. (L 22) 12.
55. FROHLINGER, supra note 51, at 7.
FERNSEHEN
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sions in accordance with article 85, paragraph 3, and the exemption
provision of article 90, paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty could be considered in this context. Article 90, paragraph 2, however, cannot be a
transformer of broadcasting law. First, there are fundamental doubts
about its applicability to broadcasters. 56 Second, the provision is only
applicable if other provisions, such as the exemption procedures in
article 85, paragraph 3, are useless points of reference. Finally, article
90, paragraph 3 only applies if a broadcaster's performance is otherwise obstructed. The requirements for exemption cases in line with
article 90, paragraph 2 are strictly interpreted and those seeking exemptions carry the burden of proof.5 7 The special regulation of article

90, paragraph 2, therefore, can have, at most, a very limited impact.
The exemption possibilities of article 85, paragraph 3 of the EEC
Treaty only apply to the bans on trusts, not to abuses of market dominant positions. Exemption depends upon narrow definition requirements. Here too, the burden of proof rests upon those seeking
undertakings.58 The content of the exemption provision connects with
aspects of economics. Economic aspects relating specifically to broadcasting could only be integrated here via extremely broad interpretation. This, however, has not been the case.5 9 The EC Commission has

generally been quite restrained in incorporating cultural values.
There are no recognized means of taking into account the decisions of
national legislators relating to the organization of broadcasting in the
application of EC competition law. Once again, this exposes the fundamental problem facing the EC in its media activities: The EEC
Treaty was not designed to establish the politico-cultural unity of
member states in Europe. The EC lacks a political constitution and,
consequently, a communications constitution. The lack of an EC communications constitution could eliminate the special features of respective cultural considerations when the EEC Treaty is applied to
broadcasting. Under the EEC Treaty, broadcasting is solely subjected
to the economic market.

56. For a discussion against applicability, see Television Without Frontiers, supra note
35, at 189, 192 et seq.; for a discussion in favor of applicability, see H.D. Jarass, EG-Recht
und nationales Rundfunkrecht. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Reichweite der Dienstleistung.
sfreiheit, 1 EUROPARECHT 75, 81 (1986).
57. I. Pemice in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWO-VERTRAO art. 90 at 53 et seq. (E. Grabitz cd.,
Munich: Beck).

58.

BEuTLER,

supra note 10, at 340.

59. Commission Decision 891536, 1989 O.J. (L 284) 41.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Non-Europeans often find it hard to understand many Europeans' concerns that economization of broadcasting can jeopardize the
freedom of broadcasting. The advocates of broadcasting regulation
are also sometimes accused of risking a dangerous state influence in
this field. A look at the past suggests that such criticism of state influence is by and large justified. However, Europe has also developed
independent broadcasting traditions. Britain's BBC is quite rightly regarded as a prototype of such a tradition. In countries such as Germany, models based on this prototype have been developed. These
models aim to combine independent broadcasting with state involvement in the workability of the broadcasting constitution, in areas such
as achieving diversity and protection against the concentration of
power.
The values and traditions upon which the current European media culture is based are not legally questioned by the activities of the
EC. However, partial harmonization through the Television Directive
has exerted a strong de facto influence towards a market model of
broadcasting. The undifferentiated application of competition law to
broadcasting may also reinforce this tendency. There is an absence, at
a European level, of mechanisms which take into account cultural requirements. A European political constitution is required. Without
this, Europe's broadcasting order will develop irreversibly into a deregulated economic market. Europe would then gain a common media
market, but lose the cultural and constitutional policy dimension of its
communications constitution.6 0 In the long term, such a reshaping of
the broadcasting landscape would lead to a shift of paradigms with
considerable legal and political implications.

60. For a critical view, see also B. B6mer, Kompetenz der EG zur Regelung einer

Rundfunkordnung, 29 ZUM 577, 586 (1985); WOLFGANG HoFtiANN-Rw_, ERos oxN
DES RuNDFuaNREcms (1990); M. Stock, Europfiisdhes Rundfiunkrecht im Werden, 2-3
RuF 183, 191 et seq. (1989).

